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I. Introduction 
The debate between defenders of 'foundational 1 
views of justification and their critics is of current 
and wide interest among epistemologists. Many have 
declared foundationalism to be defunct or at least 
seriously discredited, and there has been a 
corresponding increase of interest in 'coherentist' 
epistemologies. Others have maintained that reports of 
the death of foundationalism have been greatly 
exaggerated; often such writers claim that 'minimal' or 
•modest* foundational views do not succumb to common 
anti-foundational attacks. What I wish to argue here 
is that the distance between foundationalism per se and 
coherentism per se is not as great as it is often 
played-up to be, and that in fact some varieties of 
these two sorts of view are entirely compatible. 
II. Foundationalism 
I take 'foundationalism' and 'coherentism' to be 
names for different kinds of theories .concerning the 
structure of doxastic justification. In the main, 
contemporary writers tend to see foundationalism as 
motivated 2 a n < * supported by the so-called 'regress 
argument'. Roderick Chisholm provides us with a 
classic formulation of this argument: 
In many instances the answers to our questions 
will take the following form: "What justifies me 
in thinking that I know that a is F is the fact 
that it is evident to me that b is G." . 
This type of answer to our Socratic questions 
shifts the burden of justification from one claim 
to another. For we may now ask, "What justifies 
me in counting it as evident that b is G?" or 
"What justifies me in thinking I know that b is 
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G?" And possibly we will formulate once again, 
an answer that b is G is the fact that it is 
evident that c is H." . . . We might try to 
continue ad Infinitum, justifying each new claim 
that we elicit by still another claim. Or we 
might be tempted to complete a vicious circle: 
in such a case, having justified "a is F" by 
appeal to "b is G,11 and "b is G" by reference to 
"c is H," we could then Justify "c is H" by 
reference to "a is F." But if we are rational 
beings, we will do neither of these things. For 
we shall find that our Socratic questions lead us 
to a proper stopping place. 
Of course, Chisholm's formulation of the argument is by 
no means complete, for he does not tell us why it is 
that rationality forbids us to accept an infinite 
regress or a circle of justifiers. In a recent 
discussion of the regress argument, William Alston 
invites us to think of the structure of the 
justification of a 'mediately justified belief (i.e., 
a belief that is justified by some other belief or 
beliefs) as 
. . . a more or less extensive tree structure, in 
which the original belief and every other 
putatively mediately justified belief form nodes 
from which one or more branches issue, in such a 
way that every branch is a part of^some branch 
that issues from the original belief. 
Now, Alston proceeds to tell us, as the tree branches 
upward from the ' trunk • (i.e., from the original 
belief), there are only four possible courses that any 
given branch might take: 
(1) The branch might terminate in an 'immediately 
justified' belief (i.e., a belief that is 
justified by something other than another 
belief). 
(2) The branch might terminate in an unjustified 
belief. 
(3) The branch might form a loop. 
(4) The branch might continue infinitely. 
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It is not part of our present task to conduct a 
critical study of the details of this argument; suffice 
it to say merely that the point of the argument is that 
since, for various putative reasons we shall not pause 
to examine, options (2) - (4) must be ruled out. Hence, 
we may view every mediately justified belief as the 
trunk of a tree of justification, each branch of which 
terminates in an immediately justified belief. We can 
see that what the regress arguments demands is that a 
theory o f 5 doxastic justification conform to the 
following: 
(A) There are immediately justified beliefs. 
(B) All mediately justified beliefs (ultimately) 
derive their justificatory support from 
immediately justified beliefs. 
Now it will certainly not have escaped the 
attention of anyone familiar with the literature that 
most ('traditional') foundational theories incorporate 
yet a third tenant, namely: 
(C) Immediately justified beliefs enjoy some such 
privileged epistemic status as incorrigibil-
ity, infallibility, or indubitability. 
Indeed, Keith Lehrer has called something like (C) "the 
fundamental doctrine of foundation theories", and F. L. 
Will tells us that his recent anti-foundational polemic 
"is essentially a case against incorrigibility". 
However, it would be a mistake to regard (C) as an 
essential component of foundational views for the 
following two reasons: first, the regress argument 
itself does not demand that immediately justified 
beliefs enjoy any such feature as incorrigibility, and 
so forth—when foundationalists have maintained that 
the 'foundations' must be, e.g., incorrigible, they 
have done so primarily due to considerations 
independent of the regress argument; and second, there 
have been foundational theories, e.g., that of Thomas 
Reid, that do not require any incorrigible (etc.) 
beliefs. Thus, we may take (A) and (B) alone as 
constituting what is essential to foundational theories 
of doxastic justification as such. In recent 
literature, writers have referred to foundational views 
that include only (A) and (B), and that do not include 
(C), as 'minimal' or 'modest' foundational views; some 
refer to views that also include (C) as 'radical' 
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foundationalism. We shall adopt their terminology 
here. 
Before moving onto a discussion of coherence views, 
I want to point out some of the many issues regarding 
what we might loosely refer to as the content of a 
theory of doxastic justification that have been left 
entirely undecided or unprejudged even by accepting (A) 
and (B) as defining the form of such a view. Here are 
some examples: (a) In exactly what way or ways can a 
belief come to be justified by something other than its 
relations to other beliefs? (b) In exactly what way or 
•ways can one belief confer warrant upon another? (c) In 
order for one belief to justify another, must the 
former be true or merely justified itself? (d) If, for 
some person S, S's belief that p_ is justified by 
his/her belief that g, must S infer p> from g? (e) If, 
in order for one of S's beliefs to justify another must 
the former be justified (or true)? and so forth. 
Different answers to such questions would generate 
different theories of doxastic justification, but they 
would all be foundational theories. 
III. Coherentism 
Traditionally, coherence theories have been seen by 
foundationalists and their critics alike as the 
leading, and perhaps the only, alternatives to 
foundational ism. Much of the work on coherentism 
purports to deal with the so-called 'coherence theory 
of truth 1, which is offered as an alternative to the 
venerable correspondence theory of truth. However, 
very often writers who espouse such a view not only 
wish to define truth, but also to offer a criterion for 
the truth of statements. Such a 'criterial' theory of 
truth according to one recent writer, aims at 
specifying "the test-conditions for determining whether 
or not there is warrant for applying the 
characterization 'is true' to [statements]." In other 
words, these views are theories of doxastic 
justification, in that they supply us with criteria 
that we can employ to determine whether we are 
justified in believing a statement (to be true). 
The fundamental claim of the coherentist is that 
justified beliefs are always justified by virtue of 
their relationships to other beliefs. Is there an 
argument or line of reasoning that is primarily 
responsible for the acceptance of this claim, in the 
same fashion that the regress argument supports the 
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main claims of the foundationalist? Although a perusal 
of traditional coherentist literature can prove 
bewildering, I believe that such an argument can at 
least be 'rationally reconstructed'. One theme that 
can be found in almost all non-foundational 
epistemologies is that there are no beliefs 
(statements, propositions, judgments, etc.) that enjoy 
any such priviledged epistemic status as infallibility, 
indubitability or incorrigibility. As I mentioned 
above, arguments supporting this common theme are often 
given as though they are straight-forward arguments 
against foundationalism, no doubt because so many 
foundational views do maintain that some beliefs (etc.) 
are indeed infallible (etc.). However, in view of what 
was said above, it is obvious that attacks on notions 
such as incorrigibility or infallibility do not 
constitute attacks on foundationalism. (Indeed, it 
would seem that a coherentist's taking arguments 
against, say, infallibility, as arguments against 
foundationalism proper is on a par with a 
foundationalist's taking coherence to amount to nothing 
more than consistency.) Nonetheless, as I shall claim, 
such arguments are relevant to the more general anti-
foundational cause. How so? Another common theme 
throughout much ('traditional') coherentist literature 
is that the possibility of error entails the presence 
of inference; that is, if it is possible for some 
belief (statement, etc.) to be in error, this shows 
that that belief (statement, etc g) was inferred, 
perhaps 'unconsciously', from others. Now this claim, 
combined with the one mentioned just above, does 
produce an argument for the coherentist's major thesis: 
(1) Any belief that is prone to error is inferred 
from other beliefs. (This is the second 
claim just discussed.) 
(2) No beliefs are immune to error. (This is one 
way of putting the first claim discussed 
above.) 
(3) All beliefs are inferred from other beliefs. 
(I shall refer to this as the argument for the 
•inference-ladenness' of belief.) Now, on the 
assumption that, if one belief is inferred from 
another, then the latter must count as a reason for the 
former (as well, that is, as a cause), then this seems 
to follow from (3): 
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(D) All justified beliefs are mediately justified 
beliefs. 
Furthermore, it is part and parcel of the coherence 
view that there is a single relationship (that may hold 
between beliefs) that suffices to justify all of one's 
justified beliefs. This relationship goes by the name 
'coherence'. Here I shall adopt a general schema from 
Keith Lehrer for coherence theories of justification: 
(E) S's belief that p_ is justified if, and only 
If, S's belief that f> coheres with other 
beliefs belonging to a system of beliefs of 
kind k. 
Of course, it is evident that an explication of the 
relation of coherence, as well as an exact 
specification of what kind of system of beliefs kind k 
is, are needed in order to fill out this schema; 
different conceptions of these two crucial notions 
would produce different versions of the coherence view. 
It would take us too far afield here to survey the 
ways in which various writers have filled out this 
general schema for coherence views. What is really 
essential for present purposes is the coherentist's 
commitment to (D). Just as we proposed (A) and (B) as 
essential to any foundational view, so, too, are we 
claiming that (D) is the defining characteristic of all 
non-foundational views (of which almost all are 
coherence theories). 
IV. The Relationship Bewteen the Two Views 
It will be recalled that, because of the demands of 
the regress argument, the foundationalist insists upon 
the existence of immediately justified beliefs: 
(A) There are immediately justified beliefs. 
The notion of an immediately justified belief can 
be more explicitly spelled out by saying that such a 
belief is one that is justified by something other than 
any other belief or beliefs. Now this can be 
understood in either a strong or a weak sense. 
Understood in the strong sense, an immediately 
justified belief is one that is solely justified by 
(i.e., that receives all of its justification from) 
some source other than some other belief or beliefs. 
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In the weaker sense, an immediately justified belief is 
one that receives at least some, but not necessarily 
all, of its justification from some source exclusive of 
other beliefs. 
At this point, let us recall that the fundamental 
insight behind the coherence view of doxastic 
justification is that justified beliefs are always 
justified by virtue of their relationships to other 
beliefs: 
(D) All justified beliefs are mediately justified 
beliefs. 
The notion of mediately justified belief, like that of 
immediately justified belief, can be understood in a 
strong or a weak sense. In the former, a mediately 
justified belief is a justified belief that receives 
all of its justificatory support from some other belief 
or beliefs, while, according to the weaker sense, such 
a belief is one that receives at least some of its 
justification from other beliefs. 
As we are employing the term 'justified b e l i e f , a 
belief is justified by virtue of its possessing certain 
properties; that is, we suppose that if a given belief 
possesses some special property (e.g., it's 'coherence' 
with certain other beliefs, or it's incorrigibility, 
etc.), then it is rational (reasonable, etc.) for the 
person holding the belief to do so. In accordance with 
the distinctions drawn just above, then: 
An immediately justified belief (strong sense) is 
solely justified by virtue of possession of some 
property P that is not a relational property 
involving any other justified belief. 
A mediately justified belief (strong sense) is 
justified solely by virtue of possession of some 
property R that is a relational property 
involving another justified belief. 
An immediately justified belief (weak sense) is 
justified at least in part by virtue of posses-
sion of some property P that is not a relational 
property involving any other justified belief. 
A mediately justified belief (weak sense) is 
justified at least in part by virtue of posses-
sion of some property R that is a relational 
property involving another justified belief. 
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Now it should be clear just in what sense it might 
be claimed that foundationalism (per a se) and 
coherentism (per se) are compatible; they are 
compatible in that given view of doxastic justification 
might be both foundational and coherentist according to 
the way we have defined these two sorts of views. And 
this is entirely within the realm of possibility, as 
long as (A) is understood in the light of the weaker 
sense of immediately justified belief, and (D) is 
understood in terms.of the weaker sense of mediately 
justified belief. And this, of course, is because 
the weaker versions of these two principles are 
perfectly compatible. These versions are compatible 
because it is quite possible for a given belief to have 
two warrant-conferring properties, P and R, such that R 
is a relational propery involving another justified 
belief and P is not. But I wish to claim more than 
that such a view is possible, for there are many things 
that are possible in any of the various senses of 
'possibility'; I want to argue that the weaker 
interpretations of (A) and (D) are more plausible than 
are the stronger ones. 
In order to make good this claim, let me begin by 
bringing the regress argument back under consideration. 
Speaking in very general terms, the reasons why all of 
the alterntives other than the existence of immediately 
justified beliefs are rejected amount to this: unless 
there is some justification in a system of beliefs that 
is not itself internal to the system, then there is no 
reason to suppose that any of the beliefs belonging to 
that system are justified. For example, to consider 
only the possibility of circular justification for the 
moment, suppose we allow belief X to be justified by 
belief Y, and this belief to be justified by belief Z, 
and Z, in turn, to be justified by belief X. Now 
accepting the principle that one belief can Justify 
another only if the former is itself justified, all 
that we know is that X is justified only if Y is, that 
Y is justified only if Z is, and that Z is justified 
only if X is. But we do not thereby know whether any 
of these beliefs are, indeed, justified. We might 
think in terms of the following analogy: picture, if 
you will, three glass spheres (x, y and z ) , connected 
by three pipes (so as to make a triangle) such that 
liquid can flow from one sphere to the next. Now, 
liquid will flow through the system, but only if (at 
least) one of the spheres comes with liguid already in 
it (i.e., is 'self-justified') or receives liquid from 
some source outside the system (i.e., is immediately 
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justified in some mode other than self-justification). 
And if one of the spheres does come with liquid already 
in it (or gets liquid from some source other than the 
other two spheres), then there will be liquid available 
to move through the system. Now suppose that two of 
our three spheres come to the system with liquid 
already in them: each stands to gain liquid from the 
other (i.e., each is mediately justified) even though 
each contained some liquid before entering the system 
(i.e., each is immediately justified). These kinds of 
considerations should suffice to show that all that is 
needed to meet the demands of the regress argument are 
immediately justified beliefs in the weaker sense. 
Furthermore, if we reflect a moment on the argument 
for the inference-ladenness of belief, we can see that 
it supports (D) only under the weaker interpretation of 
'mediately justified'. For, what the argument proves 
(if it is sound) is that all beliefs receive justifi-
catory support from other beliefs. But surely much 
more would be required in order to show that no beliefs 
receive any justificatory support from sources 
exclusive of any other beliefs; one would have to 
examine and refute, for example, all proposed modes of 
immediate justification (and there are several). 
Thus, if what I have said in this and the preceding 
paragraph is correct, then the weaker version of (A) is 
the most plausible version, in that it, and not the 
stronger version, is supported by the regress argument. 
And similarly, the weaker version of (D) is the most 
plausible version because it, and not the stronger 
version, is supported by the argument for the 
inference-ladenness of belief. 
V. Conclusions 
If the essence of foundationalism is captured by 
the weaker versions of (A) and (B), and if the essence 
of ('minimal') coherentism is captured by the weaker 
version of (D), then there would appear to be no 
essential incompatibility between the two sorts of 
view. This is not to claim, of course, that there is 
no incompatibility between say, Lewis' foundational 
theory and Bradley's coherence theory. What I am 
claiming, however, is that these views are not 
incompatible just because one is a foundational view 
and the other is a coherence view. The incompatibility 
arises because, among other things, Lewis' foundational 
view is 'radical', not 'minimal', and Bradley's 
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coherence view is also 'radical' (in subscribing to the 
stronger version of (D)) and not 'minimal'. I suggest 
that the proper way to view the relationship between 
foundational and coherentist theories of doxastic 
justification is this: such views form a continuum, 
with the 'radical' versions occupying positions at 
opposite ends, and with the 'minimal' versions meeting 
at the center. 
So what is the importance of all this? First of 
all, if we think of various foundational and 
coherentist views of doxastic justification as falling 
somewhere on a continuum or spectrum of such views, 
then the tendency to think in terms of a simplistic 
foundationalist vs. coherentist dichotomy vanishes. 
The matter is much more complex than such a dichotomy 
indicates. Secondly, the continuum serves as a warning 
to those who would delve into the literature; it warns 
the researcher to be very careful to see just what it 
is that various writers mean when they throw around 
terms like 'foundationalism' and 'coherentism'. Most 
writers mean by the former what we've termed * radical 
foundationalism', and hence the theories of writers 
like Lewis or Descartes are held up as paradigms of 
foundational thought, while more modest views (like 
Reid's) go unmentioned. Similarly, most writers use 
the term 'coherentism' to refer to the 'radical' views 
of the likes of F. H. Bradley or Brand Blanshard, 
while, again, more modest views (like Rescher's) go 
relativel unnoticed. 
But most importantly, the upshot of my remarks is 
this. The point, of a significant portion of 
epistemological activity, should be to produce a 
correct theory of doxastic justification. Whether we 
decide to call this view 'foundationalist' or 
'coherentist' is of relatively little importance. I've 
tried to indicate that the minimal versions of both 
types of view (the versions toward the center of the 
continuum) are the more plausible versions, for it is 
these that the regress argument and the inference-
ladenness argument support. It just may be that the 
most plausible view is both foundational and 
coherentist in our sense; indeed, although I lack the 
space to argue the point here, it is my belief that 
some recent contextual theories of doxastic 
justification are the most convincing sorts of such 
views, and are, in fact, the sorts o| 4views that count 
as both foundational and coherentist. 
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NOTES 
By a theory of 'doxastic' justification I mean a 
theory about how beliefs are justified. 
2 
The regress argument is at least as old as 
Aristotle; see Posterior Analytics, Book I, Chapter 3. 
For some more recent discussions of the connection 
between foundationalism and the regress argument see: 
W. P. Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism," Journal 
of Philosophy, vol. LXXIII (April 8, 1976); J. Cornman, 
"Foundational Versus Non-Foundational Theories of 
Empirical Justification," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 14; D. Annis, "Epistemic 
Foundationalism," Philosophical Studies vol. 31 (May 
1977), pp. 345-52; A. QuintoiT^ "The Foundations of 
Knowledge," in Chisholm and Swartz (eds.), Empirical 
Knowledge (Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 542-70. 
3 . . R. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd Edition 
(Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 19. 
4 
Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism," p. 172. 
5 
Assuming, of course, that there are mediately 
justified beliefs. 
K. Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1974), pp. 78-79; F. L. Will, Induction and 
Justification (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1974), p. 225. 
7 
C. I. Lewis, for example, adopts (C) due to 
considerations concerning the nature of probability, 
summed up by his claim that "if anything is to be 
probable, then something must be certain." See An 
Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Open Court, 1946), 
p. 186. 
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°N. Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 1. 
9 
See, for example, B. Blanshard, The Nature of 
Thought (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1939), chapters 
II and XXV. 
1 0Lehrer, p. 154. 
1 1 T h e r e are, of course, stronger and weaker ways of 
reading (B) as well. However, it is generally intended 
in the weaker sense, in which mediately justified 
beliefs may receive justificatory support due to 
•coherence' with other beliefs. 
12 . 
William Alston provides an extensive list and 
discussion of various proposed modes of immediate 
justification in "The Justification of Perceptual 
Beliefs," unpublished. 
13 
If one compares Rescher's "data" with Pollock's 
"prima facie justified belief", it will become evident 
that Rescher's view does incorporate immediately 
justified beliefs (in the weak sense). See N. Rescher, 
The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973), and J. Pollock, Knowledge and 
Justification (Princeton University Press, 1974). 
14 
For example, see D. Annis, "A Contextual Theory 
of Epistemic Justification," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 15 (July 1978). 
